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THE SECOND AMENDMENT
The language gives us no such right
With the U.S. Supreme Court agreeing to hear a case on the ownership of guns by private citizens, a debate that has been simmering will become hot. Here are two of many views of the long-controversial amendment.
By Jeffrey P. Kaplan
November 23, 2007
The Supreme Court is going to revisit the Second Amendment, for the first time since 1939.
The main issue in construing the Second Amendment has always been the relation between the first part, “A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state,” and the second part, “the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.” Let me try to shed some linguistic light on this, without suggesting that a linguistic analysis is the end of the story.
Grammatically, the first part is an “absolute clause,” meaning a tenseless clause modifying a main tensed clause. The relation between an absolute clause and the main clause it modifies can be of two flavors, roughly speaking “attendant circumstance” and “rationale.” Attendant circumstance absolute clauses just describe a circumstance or state that accompanies the fact or event described in the main clause. For example, “The crackers crunching, Charlie gobbled up his snack.” A rationale absolute clause states a reason, a cause, a precondition, or the like, for the main clause. For example, “The movie being rated R, little Fred's parents won't allow him to see it.”
To see how the absolute clause in the latter example is understood as providing a rationale for the main clause it modifies, imagine a conversation between little Fred and his parent. Little Fred has asked to see a certain movie:
Dad: The movie being rated R, you cannot see it.
LF: But it's rated PG.
Dad: Oh, OK, then, you can see it.
Now imagine a different version of this conversation:
LF: But it's rated PG.
Dad: Well, you still can't see it.
LF: BUT YOU SAID (shouting)
In the second version, little Fred is justifiably angry because he – understandably – took Dad's explanation (“The movie being rated R,”) as implying that without the absolute clause's condition, little Fred could see the movie. So the validity of the main clause of that utterance (“you cannot see it”) is conditioned on the truth of the absolute clause.
There can be no doubt that the Second Amendment's absolute clause is a rationale type, not an attendant-circumstance type. It contains being, like the little Fred example, and being-type absolutes are rationale types (with a couple of exceptions). Notice the contrast between “The crackers crunching, Charlie gobbled up his snack” and “The crackers being crunchy, Charlie gobbled up his snack.” The latter states a reason why Charlie gobbled; the former doesn't.
In addition, trying to contradict the relation of rationale results in a logical contradiction. There is no contradiction in “The crackers crunchy, Charlie gobbled up his snack, but the crackers crunchiness was not the reason Charlie gobbled up his snack,” but try adding the following clause to the language of the Second Amendment: “but a well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state is not a reason that the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.” Logical contradiction results.
A connection of rationale between an absolute clause and a main clause requires that the absolute be true. Imagine an offer: “Today being St. Patrick's Day, I will buy drinks for everybody.” If the speaker is mistaken – it's not March 17 – the offer is invalid. This is relevant because the absolute clause in the Second Amendment is actually false: in terms of meaning, it is a general statement (technically a “generic” proposition) akin to “A lion is a carnivore” or “Puppies are playful.” You need more than a single counterexample to prove such general statements false. (One vegetarian lion does not disprove “A lion is a carnivore.”)
But if you think about it, there are, and historically have been, a great many free states whose security has not depended on a well-regulated militia, including most modern states, as well as many states from different periods of history. The authors of the Second Amendment surely believed that the absolute clause they wrote was true, but it actually wasn't, even then, because of its generality.
It may have been true that the security of the brand-new United States did depend on a militia, but that is not what the amendment says. Because the absolute clause is, strictly speaking, false, the footing on which the main clause of the Second Amendment depends disappears. The result is an amendment that not only now is moot, but always has been, in effect, void, at least in terms of its linguistic meaning.
The case can be made to construe it in terms of its writers' intentions instead of its meaning, but should a meaning that a constitutional sentence cannot literally bear be imposed on it, in order to honor its writers' intent? Maybe; there are cases of this in our legislative history. Constitutional “textualists” including Justice Antonin Scalia have opposed this, arguing that a constitutional provision's ordinary meaning should drive its interpretation, not non-textual sources like legislative intent.
Whichever approach the court takes next spring when it decides District of Columbia v. Heller, the linguistic meaning of the Second Amendment should be the starting point for the legal analysis. And that meaning provides no basis for finding a constitutional protection for individuals to keep and bear arms.
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Kaplan is professor and chair of the Department of Linguistics and Asian/Middle Eastern Languages at San Diego State University.