Stand your ground or murder? (Video of the event)

[Heffay]

Was it unwise to provoke a bunch of drunk partygoers with a video camera and threats of calling the cops?

If you make some unwise decisions, shouldn't you be held responsible for the end results of those decisions? At least partially?

I think a big problem people have is they are looking for just one person to put the fault entirely on, when multiple people can easily be blamed.

One person making a mistake is a life lesson. Two people making a mistake is news.

[bulletproof]

If you make some unwise decisions, shouldn't you be held responsible for the end results of those decisions? At least partially?
I think a big problem people have is they are looking for just one person to put the fault entirely on, when multiple people can easily be blamed.
One person making a mistake is a life lesson. Two people making a mistake is news.

If you make wise decisions, should you be held responsible for the end results of those decisions? Perhaps if this man was unarmed he would be dead right now.

While people can make a number of decisions, blame generally lies somewhere. If you're drunk driving and someone runs a stop sign and you hit their car and kill them, are they at fault or are you?

[jdege]

You can only fail the "Unwilling Participant" test by engaging in illegal activities.

That's not true. Maybe you want it to be true, but that's not how the real world works.

It's how it works here in Minnesota. Note how the standard jury instructions were modified to change "If the defendant began or induced the incident that led to the necessity of using force in the defendant's own defense" to "If the defendant began or induced the assault that led to the necessity of using force in the defendant's own defense" specifically to remove this confusion about what sort of behavior can deprive an individual of the right to self defense.

You cannot surrender your right to self defense by engaging in legal activities.

CRIMJIG 7.07 Self-Defense—Revival of Aggressor's Right of Self-Defense

If the defendant began or induced the assault that led to the necessity of using force
in the defendant's own defense, the right to stand the defendant's ground and thus defend
(himself) (herself) is not immediately available to (him) (her). Instead, the defendant
must first have declined to carry on the assault and have honestly tried to escape from it,
and must clearly and fairly have informed the adversary of a desire for peace and of
abandonment of the assault. Only after the defendant has done that will the law justify the
defendant in thereafter standing (his) (her) ground and using force against the other
person. An “assault” is (1) an act done with intent to cause fear in another of immediate
bodily harm or death; or (2) the intentional infliction of or attempt to inflict bodily harm
upon another.

Comment
See M.S.A. § 609.02, subd. 10, for the definition of assault.
A plurality of the Minnesota Supreme Court, in State v. Edwards, 717 N.W.2d 405
(2006), expressed concern that the previous jury instruction on the revival of an
aggressor's right of self-defense misstated the law as it would allow the jury to find
forfeiture based on actions that were not sufficient to trigger the right to self-defense.
Although Edwards involved the use of deadly force, the right to self-defense can also
involve the use of reasonable force (see M.S.A. § 609.06 and M.S.A. § 609.65). The
Committee has substituted the word “assault” throughout the instruction to more
accurately reflect the circumstances under which forfeiture and revival of the right of
self-defense occur. This approach incorporates the policy choices discussed in Justice
Hanson's dissent and recognizes the reasonable beliefs of the victim in responding to
defendant's initial assault.

From the case cited:

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15083818456665590983&q=State+v.+Edwards,+717+N.W.2d+405&hl=en&as_sdt=2,24&as_vis=1

Over Edwards' objection, the district court instructed the jury on an aggressor's right to a claim of self-defense. The court used CRIMJIG 7.07, which states:

If the defendant began or induced the incident that led to the necessity of using force in the defendant's own defense, the right to stand the defendant's ground and thus defend himself is not immediately available to him. Instead, the defendant must first have declined to carry on the affray and have honestly tried to escape from it, and must clearly and fairly have informed the adversary of a desire for peace and of abandonment of the contest. Only after the defendant has done that will the law justify the defendant in thereafter standing his ground and using force against the other person.

10 Minn. Dist. Judges Ass'n, Minnesota Practice—Jury Instruction Guides, Criminal, CRIMJIG 7.07 (4th ed. 1999). Edwards argues that there was no basis in the evidence for submission of the instruction and that the instruction misstates the law.

...

Legal Accuracy of CRIMJIG 7.07. In instructing the jury on Edwards' right to a claim of self-defense, the district court chose not to alter the language provided by CRIMJIG 7.07. We have stated that the district court has "considerable latitude in the selection of the language of a jury charge." State v. Pendleton, 567 N.W.2d 265, 268 (Minn.1997). But "jury instructions must not materially misstate the law." State v. Hare, 575 N.W.2d 828, 833 (Minn.1998). Edwards argues, and the dissent agrees, that the first sentence of CRIMJIG 7.07 materially misstates the law because the words "began or induced the incident" permitted the jury to find that he was the initial aggressor merely because he started a conversation with Oliver. Jury instructions are viewed in their entirety to determine whether they fairly and adequately explained the law of the case. State v. Jones, 347 N.W.2d 796, 801 (Minn.1984).

CRIMJIG 7.07 was drawn from instructions on self-defense that we described, more than 35 years ago, as "fair, complete, logically arranged, and legally sound." Love, 285 Minn. at 451, 173 N.W.2d at 427. In Love, a portion of the instructions read as follows:

Where a person seeks or induces a quarrel which leads to the necessity in his own defense of using force against his adversary, the right to stand his ground and thus defend himself is not immediately available to him, but, instead he first must decline to carry on the affray, must honestly endeavor to escape from it, and must fairly and clearly inform his adversary of his desire for peace and of his abandonment of the contest.

Id. at 451, 173 N.W.2d at 426. It is true that trial courts must use analytical precision in drafting instructions on self-defense 412*412 and should modify pattern jury instructions when necessary. State v. Marquardt, 496 N.W.2d 806, 806 (Minn.1993) (stating that jury instructions on self-defense should have been modified to fit the contentions of the parties). But Edwards did not request that CRIMJIG 7.07 be modified or supplemented.

Contrary to Edwards' suggestion, CRIMJIG 7.07 does not permit a jury to ground forfeiture of the defense simply on conversation. In the context of the instruction, the natural understanding of the word "incident" is that of a quarrel or conflict with potentially serious consequences. The instruction uses the words "affray" and "contest" interchangeably with "incident." The instruction requires that the defendant have a "desire for peace" before the right of self-defense is restored. When read as a whole, the instruction contemplates conduct that is a good deal greater than mere conversation.

...

HANSON, J., dissents with opinion in which PAGE and MEYER, JJ., join.

ANDERSON, PAUL H., Justice (concurring).

I concur. In so doing, I agree with the dissent's concern that CRIMJIG 7.07 on self-defense may misstate the law and is in need of revision. Nevertheless, the facts of this case do not establish that appellant Brian Keith Edwards met his duty to retreat if at all possible to avoid any threatened harm presented by Timothy Oliver. For this reason, I agree with the majority's alternative conclusion that any error in the submission of the instruction was harmless. Therefore, I agree that Edwards' conviction should be affirmed.

HANSON, Justice (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. I conclude that it was error to instruct the jury by use of CRIMJIG 7.07, and that such error was not harmless.[1] Accordingly, I would reverse Edwards' conviction and remand for a new trial.

The critical fact issue for the jury to resolve at trial was which person was the first to use or threaten to use deadly force. The state's evidence suggested that Edwards aimed and fired his gun first. Edwards testified that Oliver aimed and fired his gun first.

If we accept the state's evidence as true, Edwards' use of deadly force would not have been in response to anything that Oliver did and could not be considered an act of self-defense. The general self-defense instruction makes clear that self-defense is not available to the person who uses deadly force first, without justification. 10 Minn. Dist. Judges Ass'n, Minnesota Practice—Jury Instruction Guides, Criminal, CRIMJIG 7.05 (4th ed. 1999). Thus if the jury found that Edwards shot first, there would be no need for either a self-defense or a self-defense forfeiture instruction because Edwards could not have been acting in self-defense.

Edwards' version of the facts does present a self-defense issue. If we accept Edwards' testimony as true, Edwards would be entitled to the general self-defense instruction because Edwards' use of deadly force would have been in response to Oliver's prior use of deadly force. Whether a self-defense forfeiture instruction would be appropriate under Edwards' version of the 415*415 facts depends on whether any of the preliminary actions taken by Edwards were sufficient to justify the use of deadly force by Oliver. But, even if a self-defense forfeiture instruction was appropriate, the use of CRIMJIG 7.07 was error because it misstates the law by allowing the jury to find forfeiture based on actions that were not sufficient to justify the use of deadly force by Oliver, such as merely inducing a conversation.

Because I cannot determine with any degree of certainty how the jury resolved the fact issue of who shot first, I cannot say that the error in instructing the jury by use of CRIMJIG 7.07 was harmless. In other words, I cannot eliminate the possibility that the jury believed Edwards' testimony that Oliver shot first and Edwards only shot in response, but rejected Edwards' claim of self-defense because the jury concluded, incorrectly from CRIMJIG 7.07, that Edwards had forfeited his right to self-defense by inducing the conversation.

[adoptedson]

If I was only judging by the video, I'd have to say he was guilty(according to MN law). It's my understanding that your first duty is to retreat. He seemed to have plenty of time to go back home. I would never argue that he had the right to carry his weapon, or ask his neighbors to turn down the music. That's all fine and dandy, but he even said that he wasn't going to back down after the they threatened to fetch a weapon of their own. Then he waited around till they supposedly came back with a gun. Looked as if he wanted a gun fight at that point. I'm not saying he shouldn't have fired a shot, if indeed they came at him with a gun either. But it definitely seems the shooting could have and should have been avoided.

This is just my opinion based on what I know about MN PTC law, I don't know how it works in TX.

Unfortunate situation for all parties involved.

[GunGoogler]

There are a couple of things that I see that will work against him beyond what you've all mentioned: (1) he appears to be on his neighbors private property and (2) he says "I'm tired of losing to these people" which suggests vengeance and motive. I don't know how much those words will play into the case, but it set off alarms for me. It appears that he could have walked away when it began to escalate, but instead he made a comment about being tired of losing to them and stayed while continuing to make threatening statements while armed.

This is the part of the law that gets tricky for me if I"m on the other side of the camera. I'm in my yard (or my friends) our "crime or wrong" is playing music too loudly and a guy comes in who is twitchy and angry and yelling at me. He pulls again because he says he feels threatened. I put my hands up and back up, but continue to argue about the situation verbally. At what point am I allowed to defend myself? I've got an angry neighbor that appears to be trying to make a justification to use force against me when I am not at power to be a threat. As I listened to the video, I immediately thought to myself "this cameraman is saying all the things to make it sound like he's justified, but he is not doing anything to deescalate. I would feel threatened.

[Heffay]

While people can make a number of decisions, blame generally lies somewhere. If you're drunk driving and someone runs a stop sign and you hit their car and kill them, are they at fault or are you?

You both share part of the blame. The drunk driver committed vehicular homicide (or whatever the appropriate charge would be), and the guy who ran the stop sign would be guilty of running the stop sign. If either had exhibited good judgement, there wouldn't have been an accident.

Like I said, they BOTH were guilty of making bad decisions, and therefore they are both partially responsible for the result. That is why there should be an unwilling participant clause in stand your ground. There should be no question about what the smart decision is.

This isn't just a gun issue. It applies to whenever you decide to get involved. Your legal protections should change based on your actions. Do something stupid, and you share some of the blame of the outcome.

[bulletproof]

You both share part of the blame. The drunk driver committed vehicular homicide (or whatever the appropriate charge would be), and the guy who ran the stop sign would be guilty of running the stop sign. If either had exhibited good judgement, there wouldn't have been an accident.

How do they both share part of the blame? One person ran the stop sign and one person hit them. It doesn't matter that one of them was breaking the law and was drunk.

[Heffay]

You both share part of the blame. The drunk driver committed vehicular homicide (or whatever the appropriate charge would be), and the guy who ran the stop sign would be guilty of running the stop sign. If either had exhibited good judgement, there wouldn't have been an accident.

How do they both share part of the blame? One person ran the stop sign and one person hit them. It doesn't matter that one of them was breaking the law and was drunk.

Well, if you run a stop sign and get plowed into, it's generally your fault. However, if the person that hit you was drunk, then that could have affected their reaction time which is why drunk driving is illegal in the first place.

How is this not the fault of both parties? Maybe I'm misunderstanding your example.

I'm driving drunk, and run into someone who ran a stop sign, killing them. Right? How are both sides not partially responsible for that accident?

[jdege]

It's my understanding that your first duty is to retreat.

In MN, you do have a duty to retreat, outside your home.

OTOH, Rodriguez was retreating, when he shot - backing up across the street as his purported assailants closed on him. Whether that will satisfy a jury, it's hard to tell.

[bulletproof]

How is this not the fault of both parties? Maybe I'm misunderstanding your example.

One person did something illegal that lead to their death. If you jump into a bull pen and get killed, does it matter if the bull hates people wearing yellow? It may have contributed to your death, but the bull is just a bull.

[Heffay]

How is this not the fault of both parties? Maybe I'm misunderstanding your example.

One person did something illegal that lead to their death. If you jump into a bull pen and get killed, does it matter if the bull hates people wearing yellow? It may have contributed to your death, but the bull is just a bull.

In your example, both people did something illegal. That's why I'm not getting your point.

[bulletproof]

In your example, both people did something illegal. That's why I'm not getting your point.

So if the Bull didn't pay his taxes, and killed a person running a red light they're both at fault. Okay glad we could come to an agreement.

[jdege]

In your example, both people did something illegal. That's why I'm not getting your point.

And in criminal law, there's no reason both can't be convicted and sentenced. It's civil law that gets complicated.

Who gets to sue who for what?

If I made the rules, the answer would be neither. They were both engaged in illegal activities, neither would be entitled to collect damages. (Nor would their estates.)

[Heffay]

In your example, both people did something illegal. That's why I'm not getting your point.

So if the Bull didn't pay his taxes, and killed a person running a red light they're both at fault. Okay glad we could come to an agreement.

I think you need to reread your example. Or maybe I need to explain to you how I see it.

If I run a stop sign and get plowed by a drunk driver and die as a result, part of that accident is my fault.

[bulletproof]

If I run a stop sign and get plowed by a drunk driver and die as a result, part of that accident is my fault.

No it's all your fault. Lets say the driver wasn't intoxicated but rather didn't pay the tabs on his car. Is it still partially the other persons fault? They shouldn't have been driving with expired tabs.