I wrote this up a couple years ago, and it seems relevant to the discussion again. The term "reluctant participant" is a two word phrase that summarizes a somewhat complex legal concept. Below are the relevant statutes and case law that define the requirements for self defense, specifically the requirement to be a reluctant participant:
There seems to be a lot of misunderstanding about one of the four legal requirements for the use of lethal force in self defense. To refresh, the four requirements are:
1) A reasonable belief that a danger of great bodily harm or death is imminent.
2) No lesser force will do to eliminate the threat.
3) You must attempt to retreat if at all possible.
4) You must be a reluctant participant to the violence.
As permit holders, we have all been taught the above. However, these are not the actual legal requirements as defined in statute or case law. They're shorthand, a summary of the legal requirements as they currently exist. There seems to be quite a bit of misunderstanding as to #4 - being a reluctant participant. Before I get into this I want to stress that I am not a lawyer, and that this is not legal advice, but is my understanding of the relevant statutes and case law.
The statute providing the lawful use of lethal force in self defense is MN 609.065:
609.065 JUSTIFIABLE TAKING OF LIFE wrote:The intentional taking of the life of another is not authorized by section 609.06, except when necessary in resisting or preventing an offense which the actor reasonably believes exposes the actor or another to great bodily harm or death, or preventing the commission of a felony in the actor's place of abode.
https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/?id=609.065The MN Supreme Court has further qualified these requirements in State v Basting, 1997:
MN Supreme Court wrote:The elements of self-defense are (1) the absence of aggression or provocation on the part of the defendant; (2) the defendant's actual and honest belief that he or she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm; (3) the existence of reasonable grounds for that belief; and (4) the absence of a reasonable possibility of retreat to avoid the danger. State v. McKissic, 415 N.W.2d 341, 344 (Minn.App.1987) (citing State v. Johnson, 277 Minn. 368, 373, 152 N.W.2d 529, 532 (1967)); Minn.Stat. § 609.06, subd. 1(3) (1996).9 The degree of force used in self-defense must not exceed that which appears to be necessary to a reasonable person under similar circumstances. McKissic, 415 N.W.2d at 344 (citing State v. Bland, 337 N.W.2d 378, 381 (Minn.1983)).
http://caselaw.findlaw.com/mn-supreme-c ... 80453.htmlThis case, as well as those cited comprise the case law from which the four requirements for the lawful use of lethal force are determined. Specifically element #1 is what we commonly refer to as being a reluctant participant. The first instance of a ruling I was able to find where the requirement to the absence of aggression or provocation was in State v Johnson, 1967:
MN Supreme Court wrote:It is a general rule that the legal excuse of self-defense is available only to those who act honestly and in good faith. The rule requires (1) the absence of aggression or provocation on the part of the slayer; (2) the actual and honest belief of the slayer that he was in imminent danger of death, great bodily harm, or some felony and it was necessary to take the action he did; (3) the existence of reasonable grounds for such belief; and (4) the duty of the slayer to retreat or avoid the danger if reasonably possible. 9 Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 4245; 40 C.J.S., Homicide, §§ 122 and 126; 41 C.J.S., Homicide, § 395, p. 229.
http://www.leagle.com/decision-result/? ... -1950-1985There is also a jury instruction that also speaks to the requirement to be a reluctant participant, CRIMJIG 7.07:
CRIMJIG 7.07 (4th ed. 1999) wrote:If the defendant began or induced the incident that led to the necessity of using force in the defendant’s own defense, the right to stand the defendant’s ground and thus defend himself is not immediately available to him. Instead, the defendant must first have declined to carry on the affray and have honestly tried to escape from it, and must clearly and fairly have informed the adversary of a desire for peace and of abandonment of the contest. Only after the defendant has done that will the law justify the defendant in thereafter standing his ground and using force against the other person.
One of the most recent cases regarding the requirement to be a reluctant participant is State v Edwards, 2006:
MN Supreme Court wrote:[t]he law does not permit or justify one who intends to commit an assault upon another to design in advance his own defense by instigating a quarrel or a combat with a view thereby to create a situation wherein the infliction of the intended injury will appear to have been done in self-defense. State v. Love, 285 Minn. 444, 451, 173 N.W.2d 423, 427 (1970) (quoting trial court’s instructions). Nevertheless, if an aggressor withdraws from the conflict and communicates that withdrawal, expressly or impliedly, the right to claim self-defense is restored. Bellcourt v. State,390 N.W.2d 269, 272 (Minn.1986).
http://lawofselfdefense.com/law_case/st ... ourt-2006/Despite the fact that an individual having initiated an incident, provoked it, or been the original aggressor, it is still possible for him to regain his reluctant participant status. This was discussed in Bellcourt v State, 1986:
MN Supreme Court wrote:An aggressor in an incident has no right to a claim of self-defense. However, where the defendant is the original aggressor in an incident giving rise to his self-defense claim, an instruction on self-defense will be available to him only if he actually and in good faith withdraws from the conflict and communicates that withdrawal, expressly or impliedly, to his intended victim. State v. Graham, 292 Minn. 308, 310, 195 N.W.2d 442, 444 (1972). While Minnesota case law on this issue is scant, case law from other jurisdictions makes clear that an aggressor has the duty to employ all means in his power to avert the necessity of killing, and before his right to self-defense may be revived, he must clearly manifest a good-faith intention to withdraw from the affray and must remove any just apprehension or fear the original victim may be experiencing. Melchior v. Jago,723 F.2d 486, 493 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 952, 104 S.Ct. 2156, 80 L.Ed.2d 542 (1984). If the circumstances are such that it is impossible for defendant to communicate the withdrawal, “`it is attributable to his own fault and he must abide by the consequences.’” State v. Huemphreus,270 N.W.2d 457, 462 (Iowa 1978) (quoting 40 Am.Jur.2d Homicide § 150 (1968)).
http://lawofselfdefense.com/law_case/be ... ourt-1986/Obviously, the more willing a person is to participate in a violent encounter, the more difficult it will be for him to demonstrate that he in fact decided to withdraw from the encounter, and communicated that in some way to the other party. Difficult, but not impossible depending on the circumstances. What this boils down to is that a person has the legal ability to regain his reluctant participant status if he withdraws prior to the escalation to deadly force. A person may be a willing participant to a fist fight, but an unwilling participant if it escalates to a knife fight by withdrawing at the point of escalation.
The MN Supreme Court also examined the wording of CRIMJIG 7.07 and found it to be too vague and flawed:
MN Supreme Court wrote:The Legal Accuracy of CRIMJIG 7.07
After a careful examination of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.06 and 609.065, case law from other jurisdictions, and legal commentary on the forfeiture rule, I conclude that CRIMJIG 7.07 materially misstates the law in two respects.
The first flaw concerns the element of causation. CRIMJIG 7.07 creates a causal nexus between the defendant’s conduct and an “incident,” not between the defendant’s conduct and the victim’s use of deadly force. This is inconsistent with section 609.065, which does not authorize the victim to use deadly force in response to an “incident,” but only in response to an “offense” by the defendant that the victim reasonably believes exposes the victim to “great bodily harm or death.” This is also inconsistent with the notion recognized by a majority of jurisdictions that a defendant does not forfeit his right to self-defense by words alone.2 A mere glare has also been held to be insufficient. State v. Bristol, 53 Wyo. 304, 84 P.2d 757, 766 (1938). Also, a defendant is generally not regarded as an initial aggressor merely because he armed himself or went to a place where an assault was likely.3 The failure of CRIMJIG 7.07 to more narrowly define “incident” means that a jury could find that the “incident” was a conversation that the defendant began, which later escalated into the use of deadly force, even if the conversation did not legally cause the initiation of deadly force by the victim.
The second flaw in CRIMJIG 7.07 is that it does not require a finding that the defendant was in some way culpable in beginning the “incident.” I agree with one commentator’s observation that “[w]here an actor causes the conditions of his defense but does so blamelessly, there is little justification for taking away his defense. He is no more blameworthy for causing the conditions of his defense than is the actor who has made no causal contribution.” Paul H. Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One’s Own Defense: A Study in the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 Va. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1985) [hereinafter Robinson, Causing the Conditions]. Yet, the only culpability required by CRIMJIG 7.07 is the responsibility for having begun an incident.
Again, this is inconsistent with section 609.065, which does not authorize the victim to use force in response to lawful conduct by a defendant. Starting a conversation, even an angry one, would generally not be an “offense” that would cause the victim to reasonably believe that he was being exposed to great bodily harm or death, so as to justify the use of deadly force under section 609.065. According to LaFave, “[a] nondeadly aggressor (i.e., one who begins an encounter, using only his fists or some nondeadly weapon) who is met with deadly force in defense may justifiably defend himself against the deadly attack. This is so because the aggressor’s victim, by using deadly force against nondeadly aggression, uses unlawful force.” LaFave, supra, § 10.4(e). And, according to Robinson:
[I]n assault-defensive force situations, what would be considered culpability in causing issues can be resolved through the normal operation of the rules governing the effect of privileged conduct: justified conduct may not be lawfully interfered with, or lawfully defended against, while unjustified conduct may be lawfully resisted.
2 Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses § 123(b) (1984) [hereinafter Robinson,Defenses].
The word “incident” in CRIMJIG 7.07 is too vague to convey the elements of causation and culpability that are required by our self-defense statutes and the common law. As a result, CRIMJIG 7.07 misstates the law.
http://lawofselfdefense.com/law_case/st ... ourt-2006/As a result, CRIMJIG 7.07 was revised by substituting the word “assault” throughout the instruction to more accurately reflect the circumstances under which forfeiture and revival of the right of self defense occur. 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 7.07 (Supp. 2008).
http://statecasefiles.justia.com/docume ... 2-0120.pdfThis further qualifies that a person does not lose his reluctant participant status by initiating an "incident", even an argument, provided his actions were lawful. Arguing with someone, following someone, giving someone the stink eye are all legal, and thus are not justification for a person losing his reluctant participant status if the incident escalates to violence.
So, after reading all of this we find that the court has found that initiating an incident does not eliminate a persons reluctant participant status. Any lawful actions that a person performs, no matter how stupid, or whether those actions resulted in the violence, the person is still blameless to any violence that results, and does not lose his reluctant participant status for the purposes of self defense. Even when a person is a willing participant in non-lethal violence, he can regain his reluctant participant status if his opponent escalates the encounter to lethal force, and he attempts to withdraw at the point of escalation.
The meaning of the words "reluctant participant" in MN mean quite a different thing than many people realize when you dig into the details.
Again, I'm not a lawyer. Don't go getting in trouble and blaming me!
viewtopic.php?f=20&t=44837&st=0&sk=t&sd=a&hilit=reluctant+participant
except for from 'bad' people right? well I can get behind folks chasing off weirdos taping kids at playgrounds and stuff but adults should be able to handle being 'seen' doing what they do outside.
